The modern history of law reporting

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Introduction

Australia, like the United States, Canada and New Zealand, belongs to the common-law family of legal systems. This means that the law is derived from principles developed by decisions of the English courts and adapted to local conditions, except where the principles have been modified by legislation. Even where legislation applies it must be interpreted by the courts, and decisions on these interpretations are legally authoritative. For lawyers, access to reliable reports of court decisions is essential in order to decide whether a legal principle applies to a dispute on which they have been asked to advise.

Nowadays it is easy for the lawyer or law student to find reports of cases by using an online database. Online service providers such as Austlii (Australasian Legal Information Institute) operate on the basis that unless there is a good reason to the contrary (for example, where there are significant privacy concerns), every decision of superior courts, as well as of lower courts and tribunals of which records are maintained, should be reported. In practice, online databases inevitably contain both gold and dross: decisions of legal and practical importance, as well as decisions that are likely to be of no interest to anyone except the parties themselves.

Gold cannot be easily separated in this area from dross: one lawyer’s idea of worthless dross may well be another’s notion of precious gold dust. Comprehensive national databases do not select decisions on the basis of their legal significance. All decisions to which the provider has access are reported. It is left to the user to make a selection of cases relevant to him or her, using the sophisticated search tools developed by the provider.

We take comprehensive databases so much for granted that we are apt to forget how recently they appeared on the scene. Twenty years ago lawyers and students relied on reports of decisions selected by the law reporters or their editors. Publication of law reports was an explicitly selective activity; the emphasis was on identifying and publishing the gold and suppressing the dross among the thousands of decisions handed down every year. Law reporters and legal editors played a significant role in deciding which cases were published. An unpublished decision was often difficult to retrieve if a lawyer or judge who knew about the case had second thoughts about its relevance. The claim that the development of the law depends on what is not reported, as well as on what is reported, is not much of an exaggeration. This is a point that can be illustrated by reference to the history of law reporting in England, with reference to reports held in the Law Rare Books Collection in the Law Library at the University of Melbourne.
Law reporting before 1865

Before 1865, law reporting in England and the Australian colonies was left to private enterprise.1 Any barrister could set up in business as a law reporter. His success would depend on his commercial shrewdness and on the profession’s assessment of his reliability as a reporter. A few, such as Plowden in the 16th century and Burrow in the 18th century, set standards of accuracy that have been rarely equalled since. These reports are still cited today. But other reports enjoyed a dubious reputation. It was said, for example, that Espinasse (who reported English decisions between 1793 and 1807) heard only half of what went on in court and reported the other half.

Reporters would not necessarily publish all the decisions of which they had made a report. John Campbell (later a chief justice and lord chancellor) published law reports between 1808 and 1816 in order to supplement his meagre earnings in his early years at the bar. He regularly placed some of the decisions with which he disagreed in a bottom drawer marked ‘Bad Law’.

Large-scale legal publishing began in the mid-19th century. Commercial publishers who were already bringing out newspapers and professional journals employed teams of literate but needy barristers to prepare reports. Series of reports such as the Law Journal reports, the Law Times reports and the Jurist were launched in the 1840s and 1850s. They supplemented the work of the existing private reporters who usually operated as one-man enterprises. By the mid-19th century the result of this proliferation of law reports was chaos, as the growing army of law reporters scrambled to publish every morsel that fell from the lips of the higher judiciary.

Since courts would only recognise reports prepared by barristers, there was a demand for barristers to record and edit the cases. Even though the work was poorly paid it was much sought after by young barristers, who had to bear heavy pupillage fees and rent in their early years at the bar. Several prominent judges of the era began their professional lives as law reporters. Lord Blackburn, for example, reported sale of goods cases decided in the common-law courts. The decisions he reported formed the basis of a successful book he wrote on the law of sales, and the book in turn helped to boost his reputation as a leading commercial lawyer.

By the 1860s the market in law reports was sated. Many decisions were reported in four or more reports. The reports were not always consistent and contradictory versions of judgements were sometimes published by different series of law reports. Most judges delivered oral judgements and the reporters rarely possessed a reliable shorthand. Corrections often had to be made. The Law Review for February 1848 sets out a long list of cases cited from the published reports of the preceding year, in which the judges disclaimed as incorrect reports of what they were supposed to have said or done.

A further drawback to the system was that the cost of subscribing to all these series of reports was prohibitive. A leading chancery barrister of the 1860s, W.T.S. Daniel, estimated that the annual cost of all the series of reports was about £45 (about $5,200 in contemporary value).

It was Daniel who revolutionised the system of law reporting. A reform-minded barrister, he was also an active member of the Association for the Promotion of Social Science. In 1863 he wrote an open letter to the solicitor-general, Sir Roundell Palmer (later appointed chancellor as Lord Selborne), on ‘the present system of law reporting: its evils and the remedy’. Following the custom of the day the letter was no scribbled note; it consisted of 66 pages of closely argued text. Daniel
identified four defects of the law reporting system: expense, prolixity, delay and irregularity in publication, and inaccuracy. The defects were attributed by Daniel to the fact that the reports were prepared ‘under the lash of competition’. Treating law reports as an object of commerce, insisted Daniel, led to ‘an increase in quantity, to the deterioration of the article to be consumed, and at the same time to an increase in the cost’.

The open letter persuaded Selborne to requisition a meeting of the bar to discuss the state of law reporting in England. The meeting voted to establish a committee, of which Daniel was a member, to hear submissions on the desirability of establishing an official, or authorised, system of law reporting.

Some submissions argued that law reporting should be a government responsibility. But this was rejected on the grounds that there was no justification for imposing on taxpayers the burden of paying for law reports. Other submissions proposed that only official law reports should be received and recognised by the courts. This submission was also rejected, on the grounds that it was wrong for the courts to promote and protect monopoly. The rejection proved to be prescient, for reasons described below.

The introduction of authorised law reporting in 1865

The solution recommended by the bar committee and adopted by the legal profession was to establish a system of authorised law reporting administered by the profession. A Council of Law Reporting, later incorporated by royal charter, including representatives of the bar and the solicitors’ branch of the profession, oversaw the reporting of cases and the publication of cases.
On one point council members were dogmatic. Only decisions raising questions of legal principle should be reported. The fact that a decision attracted public interest and newspaper comment did not justify its publication if it raised no issue of legal principle. The principal fear of the founders of authorised reporting was that too many cases would be reported and that the chaos of the bad old days of the private reporters would return. A leading judge, Lord Lindley, set out the criteria of reportability. The only decisions that should be reported are those ‘which introduce or appear to introduce a new principle or rule; or which materially modify an existing principle or rule; or which settle or tend to settle a question on which the law is doubtful; or which for any other reason are peculiarly instructive’.¹

The policy of ensuring that only cases raising questions of legal principle were reported was rigorously applied by the most influential of the early editors of the law reports, Sir Frederick Pollock. He was appointed editor-in-chief in 1894 and held the position for the next 41 years, until he was 90. He took a strict view of what ‘legal principle’ meant for this purpose. Even decisions of the House of Lords, the highest court in the English legal hierarchy, which (in theory at least) only heard appeals raising important points of law, were not reported if Pollock considered that they were insignificant. According to the legal gossip of the era, Pollock would suppress a report of a first-instance decision with which he disagreed. There is in fact no evidence of this kind of censorship. But he was fussy about judicial prose style, and would not hesitate to ‘improve’ a judgement if he thought it was badly written. ‘Laying down the law is in the hands of the King’s judges’, he wrote to his reporters, ‘but it is our business to see that their decisions ... are presented to the profession in clear and intelligible form and in good English’.

The later history of law reporting
Pollock is the most influential figure in the modern history of law reporting. His commitment to reporting only decisions of legal significance is shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by all series of authorised law reports. But it was felt that by the end of his long editorship-in-chief of the law reports that he had lost his grip on what constituted, from a professional perspective, a legally significant decision. Barristers, nervous of having a relevant but unreported decision sprung on them in court, began to lose trust in the official reports. Even so, Pollock’s rigorous approach to publishing reports was applied in Australia: not all decisions of the High Court of Australia were reported in the Commonwealth Law Reports, the authorised series of High Court reports.

Pollock’s strict test of what constituted a reportable case encouraged competitors to enter the legal publishing field. Some competing reports, such as the All

Michael Bryan, ‘The modern history of law reporting’
England reports, were general in character, covering all fields of law. They obtained their niche in the law publishing market not only by publishing cases omitted from the authorised law reports but also by bringing out their reports earlier than the authorised series. Other publishers specialised in areas of law, such as family law, intellectual property law and shipping law, which were only thinly represented in the authorised reports.

The lawyer’s fear of being ambushed in court by the citation of a case of which he or she is unaware has always been a catalyst for the production of unofficial law reports. A famous English judge, Lord Denning, recalled in his memoirs that when he was in practice he represented an insurance company that defended many legal claims brought against it by relying on a clause in the insurance policy excluding the company from liability. The Court of Appeal ruled that the clause was legally effective if the insured person had signed the contract (L'Estrange v Graucob of 1934) but the authorised reports were slow to report the decision. Denning knew about the decision when many other barristers had never heard of it. "The reporter of L'Estrange v Graucob did not think much of the decision. He didn't record it in the law reports. But my company had it privately printed: and I went around the County Courts of England winning case after case most unrighteously for the Company."³

**Conclusion**

Authorised law reporting has had to steer skilfully between extremes. One extreme is the indiscriminate dissemination of trivial decisions along with the legally significant. The creation of the system of authorised reports in 1865 was a reaction against this evil. The other extreme, exemplified by the last days of Pollock's editorship-in-chief, is that an excessively narrow view can be taken of what constitutes a legally significant decision.

Nowadays online legal databases are ubiquitous. They have many advantages over their hard-copy counterparts: they are comprehensive, rapidly downloaded, and some of them operate as free services. But there is still a place for authorised reports whose accuracy is vouched for by judicial checking. Moreover, a paradox lies at the heart of contemporary law reporting: even though databases, properly used, can find almost everything for us, it is still possible for legally significant cases to be overlooked.

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¹ Michael Bryan delivered the Melbourne Law School Library’s Rare Books Lecture in November 2008 and the resulting article, ‘Early English law reporting’, appeared in *University of Melbourne Collections*, issue 4, June 2009, pp. 45–50 (available at www.unimelb.edu.au/culturalcollections/research/collections4/bryan.pdf). In November 2010 Professor Bryan delivered a second Rare Books Lecture in which he traced the history of law reporting from the mid-19th century, when authorised law reporting replaced the individual law reporter, to the modern era of instant, online law reporting. This article is based on that lecture.
